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1. Introduction 
The EU has recently adopted Regulation 656/2014, of 15 May 2014, laying down rules 
for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex).1 In spite 
of the pressing need for a common legal framework for the deployment of sea 
operations coordinated by Frontex, the process leading to the adoption of Regulation 
656/2014 has been lengthy and has required the Court of Justice of the EU to give a 
ruling in Case C-355/10.2 
One of the main legal problems raised by the implementation of border 
surveillance operations coordinated by Frontex is that participating Member States 
interpreted the applicable rules differently both in relation to the detection and 
interception of vessels as, more importantly, in relation to search and rescue situations. 
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 Regulation nº 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated 
by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, OJ L 189/93, 27.6.2014. 
2Judgment of 5 September 2012, European Parliament v. Council, C-355/10. 
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In 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/252/EU (‘the Decision’) with the aim of 
establishing clear rules of engagement for joint patrolling and for the disembarkation of 
intercepted or rescued migrants at sea.3 The aim was to overcome the different 
interpretations of international maritime law adopted by Member States and their 
diverging practices to ensure the efficiency of sea operations coordinated by the 
Agency. The Decision was adopted as a Council measure implementing the Schengen 
Borders Code in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. However, the 
European Parliament argued that the Decision introduced new essential elements into 
the Schengen Borders Code that went beyond the implementing powers conferred under 
Article 12 (5) of Schengen Borders Code. Consequently, the Parliament brought an 
action before the Court of Justice of the EU. The Court annulled the Decision because it 
contained essential elements on the surveillance of the sea external borders of the 
Member States which should have been adopted by the EU legislature.4 However, the 
Court decided to maintain the effects of the Decision until it was replaced by new rules. 
Frontex and the EU Member States have been criticized for not carrying out sea 
surveillance operations coordinated by the Agency in full compliance with human rights 
obligations. While Frontex and the Member States are clearly obliged to respect human 
rights when carrying out maritime surveillance operations within their territorial waters 
and contiguous zone, the question is much more complex on the high seas and 
especially in the territorial waters of a third country. Therefore, the most problematic 
question in Frontex operations is the extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations of the EU and its Member States. Furthermore, in the extraterritorial border 
surveillance operations different legal frameworks converge: namely, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), the International Convention 
on Maritime Search and Rescue (‘SAR Convention’) and the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention). 
Every year thousands of migrants and asylum seekers attempt to reach the territory 
of the EU Member States by sea in terrible conditions. While many efforts have been 
made by the Member States to save lives at sea, in particular after more than 400 people 
                                                           
3
 Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, OJ L 111/20, 4.5.2010. 
4
 C-355/10, supra note 2, paras. 84 and 90. 
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drowned near Lampedusa in October 2013, the situation is far from satisfactory.5 
Unfortunately, the new Regulation will not avoid the continuous shipwrecks and losses 
of lives in the Mediterranean Sea. The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent 
Regulation 656/2014 has introduced a clear legal framework for the interception and 
rescue operations coordinated by Frontex while at the same time fully respecting 
fundamental rights and, in particular, the principle of non-refoulement. In this respect, it 
is relevant to consider that some of the individuals intercepted in the context of Frontex 
operations may be entitled to international protection within the meaning of the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’). 
The paper is organized in four sections. The first section of this paper will be 
devoted to analysing the broad concept of border surveillance adopted by the Regulation 
on the sea border operations coordinated by Frontex. In the following two sections, the 
paper will focus on examining to what extent the new rules applicable to the detection, 
interception of vessels, and search and rescue situations respect the obligations arising 
from the main international law treaties binding on the Member States. Finally, in the 
fourth section, the paper provides a detailed exam of the principle of non-refoulement in 
the context of Frontex operations. It is important to determine the content and scope of 
the principle of non-refoulement when interception of vessels takes place in the 
territorial seas and contiguous zone of the Member States. Furthermore, it is crucial to 
know whether the principle applies extraterritorially, in particular on the high seas and 
in the territorial waters of third states. 
2. A broad concept of border surveillance 
The scope of application of the Regulation is the same as that of the Decision: it 
regulates border surveillance operations carried out by the Member States at their 
external sea borders under the coordination of Frontex. The Regulation states the need 
to lay down specific rules with regard to border surveillance activities carried out by 
maritime, land and aerial units of the Member States at the sea border of other Member 
States or on the high seas in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by 
Frontex. 
                                                           
5
 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘The “left-to-die boat”: actions and reactions’, 
Doc. 13532, 9 June 2014, and ‘Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?’, 29 March 2012. 
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One of the most significant novelties included in the Regulation is that it 
clarifies the concept of border surveillance. In the Decision, the concept of border 
surveillance included the interception and rescue measures arising during a border 
surveillance operation, but it was not clear to what extent those measures fell under the 
concept of border surveillance as defined in the Schengen Borders Code.6 In the new 
Regulation border surveillance is not limited to the detection of attempts of irregular 
crossing and interception measures, but also includes arrangements intended to address 
situations such as search and rescue that may arise during surveillance operations at 
sea.7  According to the preamble of the Regulation: 
‘border surveillance is not limited to the detection of attempts at unauthorised border crossings but equally 
extends to steps such as intercepting vessels suspected of trying to gain entry to the Union without 
submitting to border checks, as well as arrangements intended to address situations such as search and 
rescue that may arise during a border surveillance operation at sea and arrangements intended to bring such 
an operation to a successful conclusion’. 
In the adoption of the new rules, the amendments to Regulation 2007/2004 needed 
to be taken into account.8 Since 2011 Frontex is also entrusted with assisting Member 
States in circumstances requiring increased technical assistance at the external borders, 
taking into account the fact that some situations involve humanitarian emergencies and 
rescue at sea.9 Although the Agency does not become a SAR body, during a sea 
operation it assists Member States who are obliged under international maritime law to 
provide assistance to persons in distress.10 In practice, it appears that most of Frontex 
operations end up becoming search and rescue operations. This has been recently 
underlined by the Commission in pointing out that ‘although Frontex is neither a search 
and rescue body nor does it take up the functions of a Rescue Coordination Centre, it 
                                                           
6
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for the 
surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Members States of the European Union, COM (2013) 197, 12.4.2013 
7
 Recital 1 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
8
 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304, 1 (22 Nov. 
2011). 
9
 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 304, 1 (22 Nov. 
2011). 
10
 Recital 4 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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assists Member States to fulfil their obligations under international maritime law to 
render assistance to persons in distress’.11 
The broad concept of border surveillance enshrined in the Regulation on sea border 
operations should be understood within the context of a long-standing debate over the 
extent to which the concept of border surveillance also subsumes SAR obligations.12 
The Court of Justice examined the meaning of the concept of border surveillance in case 
C-355/10. The European Parliament contended that activities such as SAR and 
disembarkation did not fall within the concept of border surveillance.13 However, the 
Council argued that, although SAR activities cannot be considered surveillance in the 
narrow sense, in case such a situation were to occur during a Frontex maritime 
operation, ‘it would be indispensable to coordinate in advance how the search and 
rescue was conducted by various participating Member States’.14 In the Commission’s 
view, ‘in many instances, the surveillance operation will prompt the search and rescue 
situation, and it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between those operations’.15 
Finally, the Court of Justice held that border surveillance ‘entails political choices 
falling within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature, in that it requires 
the conflicting interests at issue to be weighed up on the basis of a number of 
assessments. Depending on the political choices on the basis of which those rules are 
adopted, the powers of the border guards may vary significantly’.16 Furthermore, the 
Court added that the power conferred on border guards by the contested Decision meant 
that ‘fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an 
extent that the involvement of the European Union legislature is required’.17 
 
3. Rules applicable to the detection and interception of vessels 
As regards interception, the regulation distinguishes between the detection and 
interception of vessels in the territorial sea, on the high seas and in the contiguous zone. 
                                                           
 
11European Commission, ‘Frontex Joint Operation Triton’ – concerted efforts to manage migration in the 
Central Mediterranean, 7 October 2014. 
12
 S. Carrera and L. Den Hertog, ‘Whose Mare? Rule of law challenges in the field of European border 
surveillance in the Mediterranean’, CEPS Paper nº 79, January 2015, p. 12. 
13C-355/10, supra note 2, para. 50. 
14Ibídem, para 4. 
15Ibídem, para 56. 
16Ibídem, para 76. 
17Ibídem, para 77. 
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The Regulation contributes substantially to clarify the conditions under which these 
measures may be taken. Evidently, Frontex surveillance operations at sea are bound by 
the legal regime laid down in the UNCLOS as regards both territorial waters and the 
high seas. 
In the territorial sea of the host Member State or of a neighboring participating 
State, ‘where there are reasonable grounds to suspect’, that a vessel is engaged in the 
smuggling of migrants by the sea, the Frontex operation may stop and search the 
vessels, its cargo and persons on board’.18 When the migrants are intercepted in the 
territorial sea, they must be disembarked in the coastal Member States in accordance 
with the operational plan. Therefore, the law applicable in detection and interception 
activities in the territorial sea of the Member States is clearly laid down in the 
Regulation. 
In the Commission proposal, the measures that may be adopted as regards the 
migrants intercepted in the contiguous zone were similar to the ones of the territorial 
sea.19 Therefore, in the final version of the Regulation, the relevant provisions have 
aligned to those of the UNCLOS. The authorization to board and intercept a vessel ‘may 
only be given for measures that are necessary to prevent the infringement of relevant 
laws and regulations within that Member State’s territory or territorial sea’.20  
A far more complex issue is undoubtedly that of the detection and interception of 
vessels on the high seas. According to international treaty and customary law, in this 
zone, boats are only bound by their flag State. Hence, in the new Regulation, the 
interception of ships involved in the smuggling of migrants on the high seas is subject to 
the authorization of the flag State.21 The smuggling of migrants is not contemplated by 
Article 110 of the UNCLOS as a ground for the right to visit a foreign vessel. If the 
evidence found confirms that the vessel is engaged in transporting and trafficking with 
persons, Frontex participating units may seize the vessel, order the vessels not to enter 
the territorial sea, conduct the vessels or persons on board to a third country, to the host 
Member State or to a neighbouring participating Member State. However, many of the 
                                                           
18Article 6 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
19See Meijers Committee, Standing committee of experts on international immigration, refugee and 
criminal law, Note on the Proposal for a Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of the external 
sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex (COM(2013) 197 final), 23 
May 2013. p. 4 
20
 Article 8 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
21
 Article 7 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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vessels involved in the trafficking of illegal migrants or refugees and intercepted in the 
context of Frontex operations have no nationality.22 According to Article 110(1) (d), 
warships or other duly authorized vessels of any State may exercise the right of visit on 
this sort of vessels. Besides, the Regulation contemplates the possibility that a stateless 
vessel may be engaged in the smuggling of migrants. In these cases, the Frontex 
operation would have to inform the host Member State who may take any of the 
measures mentioned above. In conclusion, the new Regulation clarifies the conditions 
under which the interception on the high seas may take place and the jurisdictional basis 
on which action may be taken as regards stateless ships.23 
4. Rules applicable to the search and rescue situations 
Account should be taken of the fact that during the deployment of Frontex surveillance 
operations at sea a situation may occur where it will be necessary to render assistance to 
persons found in distress. For those purposes, the Regulation lays down rules applicable 
to the search and rescue (SAR) situations and, should the need arise, for 
disembarkation. The obligation to render assistance to persons in distress is very often 
the legal basis for the boarding of vessels in the high seas by Member States within the 
context of Frontex operations.24 However, the responsibility under the UNCLOS and 
customary law on search and rescue situations is a competence of the Member States 
that has not been transferred to the EU. Consequently, since the UNCLOS is binding on 
the EU as regards to matters transferred by the Member States to the EU, the obligations 
arising from this Convention are not incumbent on Frontex on the rescue at sea.25 
While the rules included in the 2010 Decision were not binding, the Regulation now 
includes a set of legally-binding rules.26 It was precisely the binding character of rules 
on SAR included in the Commission’s proposal that gave rise to fierce protests from the 
part of a group of States with Mediterranean Sea borders. Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, 
France Cyprus contended that the regulation of search and rescue and disembarkation in 
an EU legislative instrument was unacceptable because these issues fell within the 
                                                           
22
 See articles 91 and 110 UNCLOS. 
23
 COM (2013) 197 final. 
24
 See Article 98 UNCLOS. 
25
 E. Papastavridis, ‘‘Fortress Europe’ and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law?’, Nordic 
Journal of International Law 79 (2010), p. 86. 
26
 Although the guidelines included in the 2010 Decision were not binding, its inclusion in the operational 
plan prepared for each Frontex operation let the Court of Justice to consider that the rules were intended 
to produce binding legal effects (Case C-355/10, supra note, para. 84). 
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exclusive competence of Member States to be exercised in the framework of 
international conventions.27 They intended to avoid that new obligations and 
responsibilities would arise from the Frontex Regulation on border surveillance when 
they carry out SAR activities. These Member States considered that these matters 
should be determined in the operational plans of each specific joint Frontex operation 
and not in the Regulation. Furthermore, since the 2011 amendments to the Frontex 
Regulation, the operational plan is clearly a binding legal document.28 This group of 
Member States finally withdrew their opposition to the adoption of the Regulation, once 
it was guaranteed that SAR and disembarkation rules were not applicable to national 
operations, such as the Mare Nostrum operation deployed by Italy in the Mediterranean 
Sea. Hence, Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of the Regulation state that the ‘operational plan 
shall contain… at least’ the listed provisions included. Even though the scope of 
application of the Regulation could lead to the deduction that SAR and disembarkation 
obligations are exclusively applicable to joint operations coordinated by Frontex, these 
provisions reassured the Member States on the fact that these requirements relate 
exclusively to Frontex operations.29 
Concerning search and rescue situations, the content of the Regulation is similar to 
that of the Decision.30 Member States are obliged to render assistance to any vessel or 
person in distress at sea during a sea operation, in accordance with international treaties 
that establish the rules on search and rescue and respect for fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, the Regulation states that the participating units in Frontex surveillance 
operations shall render assistance regardless of the nationality or status of such person 
or the circumstances in which that person is found. The new Regulation includes criteria 
to determine when a ship is considered to be in a phase of uncertainty, alert and distress. 
When any of these situations arise, Frontex participating units have to transmit all 
available information to the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) responsible for the 
                                                           
27
 “Any rules that depart from those in the international regime would be unacceptable, as we would 
effectively be creating an EU regime that runs in parallel with the international regime but which would 
be applied in Frontex-coordinated joint operations and insofar as no third countries are involved in the 
case” (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for the 
surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Members States of the European Union, doc. 14612/13, 10 October 2013) 
28
 See Article 3a (j) of the 2011 Frontex Regulation, supra note 9. 
29
 S. Carrera and L. Den Hertog, ‘Whose Mare? Rule of law challenges in the field of European border 
surveillance in the Mediterranean’, CEPS Paper nº 79, January 2015, p. 12. 
30
 Article 9 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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search and rescue area and have to follow the instructions provided by the Rescue 
Centre. A rather problematic question arises when the RCC of a third country 
responsible for a SAR area does not respond to the information transmitted by the 
Frontex operation. In those circumstances, the RCC of the host Member State should 
generally assume the coordination of the SAR situation.31 Since the SAR capacity in 
North African countries is very weak, in particular in Libya, it is essential that the 
European RCC are immediately contacted when boats in distress are identified in order 
to save lives.32 
The Regulation includes also guidelines to be followed when the boat in question is 
considered to be in a situation of uncertainty but the persons on board refuse to accept 
assistance. In this case Frontex units not only have to inform the responsible RCC but 
also shall continue to fulfil a duty of care ‘by taking any measure necessary for the 
safety of the persons concerned, while avoiding to take any action that might aggravate 
the situation’. 
Finally, the Regulation clearly establishes what it is to be included in the operational 
plan on the modalities for the disembarkation of the persons intercepted or rescued, in 
accordance with international law and respect for fundamental rights.33 As regards 
interception in the territorial sea or in the contiguous zone, the disembarkation takes 
place in the coastal Member State. As regards interception on the high seas, the 
disembarkation may take place in the third country from which the ship departed. 
However, ‘if that is not possible, disembarkation will take place in the host Member 
State’.34 
As regards disembarkation in the case of a rescue operation, the Regulation the 
Frontex coordinated operation has to cooperate with the responsible Rescue 
Coordination Centre to identify a place of safety and to ensure a rapid and effective 
disembarkation.35 The new Regulation takes into account that in case of search and 
rescue situations, the Frontex operating units would be acting under the coordination of 
the Rescue Coordination Centre. However, the Regulation lays down the possibility to 
                                                           
31
 Article 9 (2.i) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
32
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘The “left-to-die boat”: actions and reactions’, Doc. 
13532, 9 June 2014, p. 14. 
33
 Article 10 of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
34Article 10 (1.a) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
35
 Article 10 (1.c) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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disembark the rescued persons in the host Member State if the participating units are not 
released of their obligation to render assistance to the persons in distress as soon as 
possible.  
5. The Principle of Non-Refoulement in the context of Frontex Operations 
One of the most complex questions raised by Frontex operations is the application of 
the principle of non-refoulement. What is at stake is to what extent are Member States 
obliged not to return or reject persons in need of international protection to third 
countries. This discussion has dealt mainly on the treatment that must be granted to 
persons on board of the vessels intercepted on the high seas and in the territorial waters 
of third states.36 In order to determine whether the new Regulation provides a fully 
satisfactory response from the legal perspective, the content and scope of the principle 
of non-refoulement under Public International Law should be examined. In the context 
of Frontex operations, it is fundamental to know whether the principle applies 
extraterritorially, in particular on the high seas and in the territorial waters of third 
states. 
 
5.1. The principle of non-refoulement in international law 
The prohibition against transferring an individual to a country where he or she 
would face a real risk of being tortured or ill-treated is firmly anchored in international 
law. There is an express reference to the principle of non-refoulement in article 3 of the 
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading Treatment (CAT) and 
in article 33 of the 1951 Refugees Convention.37 Even though the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘Convenant’) and the European Convention on 
                                                           
36
 See A. Fischer-Lescano, T. Löhr and T. Tohidipur, ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements under 
International Human Rights and Refugee Law’, 21 International Journal of Refugee Law (2009), 256-
296; S. Klepp, ‘A contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and 
Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea’, 12 European Journal of Migration and Law (2010), 1-21; E. 
Papastavridis, supra note 25. 
37
 Article 3 of the Convention against Torture states that “no State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”), or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture”. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention says that “no Contracting 
Party shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”.  
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Human Rights (‘ECHR) do not explicitly mention the protection against refoulement, 
they have been interpreted as including such a principle.38 
Article 3 of the CAT would be violated regardless of whether the person returned or 
disembarked in a third country was actually tortured in the country of destination. The 
absolute character of the prohibition from removal when there is a reasonable risk of 
torture does not allow for any exception or derogation.39As Frederic L. Kirgis says, this 
provision ‘looks to what would be expected rather than to what actually happened after 
the individual has been turned over’.40 In order to determine whether such ‘substantial 
grounds’ exist, Article 3 of the Torture Convention requires the competent authorities 
‘to take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the 
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights’.41 The CAT Committee has considered that ‘the risk of 
torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory of suspicion. However, 
the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable’.42 Therefore, in order to 
determine if there is a risk of torture or ill-treatment in the country to which the illegal 
migrants or refugees are disembarked, attention should be paid to the prevailing 
political conditions in the receiving State and the personal circumstances of the 
individual that makes him/her vulnerable to suffer torture or other forms of ill-
treatment.43 
 Although the prohibition of disembarking or conducting an individual to a country 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of 
suffering torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is not explicitly laid down in 
Article 7 of the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee considered that it ‘would run 
counter to its object and purpose’.44 Consequently, the Committee determined that, 
                                                           
38ECHR, Soering v. The United Kingdom, judgement of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, para. 88. 
39
 The Committee against Torture considers that "another State" in article 3 refers not only to the State to 
which the individual concerned is being expelled, returned or extradited, but also to any State to which 
the author may subsequently be expelled, returned or extradited (General Comment No. 01: 
Implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22: 21/11/97. A/53/44, annex IX, 
CAT General Comment No. 01. (General Comments). 
40
 Frederic L. Kirgis, Alleged CIA Kidnapping of Muslim Cleric in Italy, ASIL, July 7, 2005, available at 
(http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/07insights050707.html. (last visited  20 February 2014). 
41
 Art. 3(2) of the Convention against torture. 
42
 General Comment No. 1 on article 3, para. 6.  
43See Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights on the question of 
torture, supra note 40, para. 31. 
44A. R. J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (1997), para. 
3.3. 
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according to Article 7 of the Covenant, States parties to the Covenant ‘must not expose 
individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or 
refoulement’.45 Also, the Human Rights Committee held that the protection against 
refoulement is included in the Article 2 obligation ‘to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized by the 
Covenant’.46 
On the other hand, it is very important to take into account the answers provided to 
this issue by the European Court of Human Rights, as the participating units in Frontex 
operations belong to States that are contracting parties of the ECHR. Even though the 
Convention does not specifically lay down an explicit prohibition against refoulement, 
the European Court of Human Rights considered this obligation to be inherent to Article 
3 of the ECHR.47The Court has stated that a Contracting State engages its responsibility 
under the Convention when it expels or returns a person to a country, where there are 
substantial grounds to believe that the person in question would face ‘a real risk’ of 
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention in the 
receiving country.48 In order to determine whether a violation of the prohibition against 
refoulement occurred or not, an assessment of conditions in the country where the 
individuals where disembarked or forced to enter should be made against the standards 
of Article 3 of the ECHR.49 
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits the expulsion or refoulement of 
any refugee to a country ‘where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
                                                           
45Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, article 7, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992), para.9, 
contained in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.  HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7. (2004). 
46
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). The Human Rights Committee 
said that the obligations of the States to “respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their 
territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or 
otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
there is a real risk or irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, 
either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any other country to which the person may 
subsequently be removed” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para. 12). 
47ECHR, Soering v. The United Kingdom, judgement of 7 July 1989, Series A No. 161, para. 88. 
48
 ECHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom, supra note 51, para. 80; ECHR, Soering, supra note 64, paras. 88 
and 113. 
49Soering, supra note 47, para. 91). In the Mamatkulov case, the ECHR stated that the existence of the 
risk of being tortured or submitted to inhuman or ill-treatment must be assessed “primarily with reference 
to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the 
expulsion” (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February, 2005, para. 69). 
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his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion’. In contrast to the international human rights treaties analysed previously, the 
Refugee Convention does not refer to the risk of suffering torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment, but rather to the danger to the life or liberty of a person for any of 
the above-mentioned reasons. Whereas in the CAT, the Covenant and the ECHR the 
protection against refoulement is considered in an absolute way and without any 
possibility of including exceptions, the Refugee Convention foresees the possibility of 
establishing limitations. In Article 33(2) it is foreseen that the prohibition of 
refoulement is not extended to those cases in which the refugee is a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime.  
Finally, given that a great number of international human rights treaties include the 
prohibition against refoulement, the conclusion could be drawn that this norm has 
acquired consuetudinary value.50 It could also be held that the principle of non-
refoulement belongs to the category of peremptory norms.51 Therefore, Member States 
participating in a Frontex surveillance operation at sea could violate this rule of general 
international law, regardless of whether they are contracting parties to the agreements 
that include the obligation of non-refoulement or not. 
 
5.2. The extraterritorial effect of the norm 
The main international human rights conventions, such as the Convenant and the ECHR 
do not expressly foresee their application to the extraterritorial activities of the States 
parties. It is crucial to determine whether or not these treaties apply to Frontex maritime 
interception operations carried out on the high seas and in the territorial waters of the 
third States. 
                                                           
50
 The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has confirmed that 
customary international law prohibits the involuntary transfer of a person who “faces a real risk of being 
subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or extrajudicial killing...” (Resolution on the 
Transfer of Persons, UN Doc. E/CN/.4/Sub.2/2005/l.12, August 4, 2005). Guy S. Goodwin-Gill says that 
the fact that States have not objected the consideration of the principle of non-refoulement as a rule of 
international customary law made regularly by international organizations, like the UN General Assembly 
and UNHCR confirmed its consuetudinary value (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in international law 
(1996). 
51See J. Allain, ‘The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement’, 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 13 
(2002); J. Santos Vara, ‘Extraordinary renditions: the interstate transfer of terrorist suspects without 
human rights limits’, in M. Glennon; S. Sur (Ed.):Terrorism and International Law, Hague Academy of 
International Law, Ed. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008, pp. 551-583 
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Although the Human Rights Committee has not pronounced itself expressly on the 
extraterritorial application of the Covenant, on the basis of the decisions of the 
Committee on Human Rights the conclusion can be drawn that the Covenant is 
applicable to the maritime interception of vessels engaged in the smuggling of migrants 
by sea. The Committee held in López Burgos v. Uruguay that the obligation that Article 
2(1) of the Covenant imposes on the State Parties to respect and to ensure the rights ‘to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ does not mean that the 
State Parties cannot be held accountable for violations of human rights that their agents 
commit in the territory of another State.52 Therefore, the Committee considered that ‘it 
would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the 
Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the 
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.53 
Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee declared that the concept of jurisdiction 
means that ‘a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant 
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated 
within the territory of the State Party’, regardless of the nationality of the victim and of 
the circumstances in which such ‘power or effective control’ had been achieved.54 It 
could be affirmed that this understanding of the concept of jurisdiction has been 
assumed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Legal 
Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
where it considered ‘that the (Covenant) is applicable in respect to acts done by a State 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’55. 
More recently, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) held that 
‘an interpretation which would restrict the scope of application of Article 33(1) of the 1951 
Convention to conduct within the territory of a State party to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol would not only be contrary to the terms of the provision as well as the object and purpose of 
the treaty under interpretation, but it would also be inconsistent with relevant rules of international 
human rights law. It is UNHCR’s position, therefore, that a State is bound by its obligation under 
                                                           
52López Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 20.  
53Id., para. 12.3. 
54Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, para.10. 
55
 Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004. 
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Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention not to return refugees to a risk of persecution wherever it 
exercises effective jurisdiction’.56 
In the same line, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently defended the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR.57 In the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. 
Italy, the Court dealt with an application made by eleven Somali nationals and thirteen 
Eritrean nationals, who were intercepted by Italian ships on the high seas and forced to 
return to Libya.58On jurisdiction, the Court held that ‘whenever the State through its 
agents operating outside its territory exercises control and authority over an individual, 
and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that 
individual the rights and freedoms’ under the Convention.59 The special nature of the 
maritime environment cannot justify an area outside the law where individuals are not 
covered by any legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of the rights and 
guarantees protected by the Convention.60 
These arguments seem to confirm that the non-refoulement obligation applies not 
only to expulsions or removals from the territory of Member States, but also to the 
treatment of persons intercepted onboard of vessels on the high seas and in the 
territorial waters of the States of departure. Independently of the fact that persons are 
illegal migrants or refugees, the participating units within the context of a Frontex 
border surveillance operation are obliged to respect the principle of non-refoulement. 
Therefore, if the Member States involved in a Frontex joint operation disembark or 
conduct persons to a country where they face a risk of being tortured or suffered an 
analogous treatment, they will incur in international responsibility for the violation of 
the human rights treaties mentioned above.61 
 
5.3. The principle of Non-Refoulement in the New Regulation 
                                                           
56
 UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 21.01.2007. 
57
 The European Court of Human Rights has maintained similar views considering that “le terme 
juridiction ne se limite pas au territoire des Hautes parties contractantes; leur responsabilité peut entrer en 
jeu à raison d’actes émanant de leurs organes et déployant leurs effets en dehors dudit territoire” (ECHR, 
Drodz et Janousek v. France and Spain, judgment of 26 juin 1992, Seris A, nº 240, para. 91). See ECHR, 
Issa v. Turkey, judgment of 6 November 2004, paras. 71-74; ECHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, (1995) Series A, 
No. 310, para.52).  
58
 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, n. 27765/09, of 23 
February 2012. 
59Ibidem, para 74. 
60Ibidem, para 178. 
61See E. Papastavridis, supra note 25, p. 105.  
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The principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 19 (2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU is developed in the new Regulation in the context of 
border surveillance activities carried out by the Member States in the context of the 
Frontex operations. The Regulation includes important improvements with a view to 
ensuring that disembarkation of intercepted or rescued persons complies with 
international human rights obligations. Article 4 of the Regulation states that 
‘No person shall, (…) , be disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the 
authorities of a country where, inter alia, there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture, persecution or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where his or 
her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, sexual 
orientation, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or from which there is a serious 
risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle of non-
refoulement’. 
As can be perceived, the Regulation introduces a clear definition of the principle of non-
refoulement. In contrast, the2010 Decision included a general reference to the obligation 
of non-refoulement without detailing its content. The new Regulation introduces a series 
of guarantees with the objective of implementing the decision taken by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi v. Italy. The forced return to 
Libya implied that the intercepted persons were not identified nor informed of their fate 
nor of the procedures that they could avail of to challenge the decision to hand them 
over to the Libyan authorities. In this judgment, the Court held that Italy infringed 
Article 3 of the Convention by exposing the persons transferred to Libya to the risk of 
being subject to ill-treatment. The Court also found a breach by Italy of Article 13 on 
the right to an effective remedy in conjunction with Article 3 and of Article 13 of the 
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.  
Article 4 of the Regulation lays down clear rules on the disembarkation of rescued or 
intercepted persons at sea. When considering the possibility of disembarking migrants 
in a third country, the host Member State of the operation, in coordination with 
participating Member States and Frontex, ‘shall take into account the general situation 
in that third country’.62 The new rules oblige to take account of the human rights 
situation in the third country, to identify the intercepted or rescued persons, to inform 
the persons on board of their destination and to give them the opportunity to express 
reasons for believing that the disembarkation in the proposed country would violate the 
                                                           
62Article 4(2) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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principle of non-refoulement.63 For those purposes, the operational plan must also 
provide ‘where necessary’ for the availability of shore-based medical staff, interpreters, 
legal advisers and other relevant experts. The determination on whether intercepted 
persons on the high seas can be returned to third countries has to be carried out upon the 
assessment by the participating units in contact with the RCC. In so doing, the aim is to 
put a clear end to the push-back practice developed in the past by certain States, and 
especially by Italy, though which migrants were forced to enter or to return to unsafe 
countries.  
In order to determine whether or not a third country is safe or unsafe, the new 
Regulation refers to information coming from a broad range of sources, including other 
Member States, EU bodies and agencies, and relevant international organizations. The 
Agency and the Member State will also have to take into account the existence of 
agreements and projects on migration and asylum between the EU, its Member States 
and third countries when making such assessment. The tendency to externalize 
migration controls and asylum policy to third countries does not contribute to the 
prevention of human rights violations.64 Therefore, the strong role provided to these 
agreements and projects concluded with third countries in the development of the 
operational plan cannot be understood. 
Since the Regulation applies not only to the interception and rescue of migrants in the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone, but also to similar activities carried out on the high 
seas, the principle of non-refoulement clearly applies to Frontex border surveillance 
operations carried out extraterritorially. This a welcome development because the EU 
asylum legislation only applies to applications made in the territorial waters of the 
Member States.65 However, as the Meijers Committee pointed out when examining the 
Commission proposal, the Regulation does fully incorporate the judgment in Hirsi.66 
The ECHR considered that the migrants should have had access to a remedy before a 
                                                           
63Article 4 (3) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
 
64See A. Baldaccini, The External Dimension of the EU’s Asylum and Immigration Policies: Old 
Concerns and New Approaches, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild, H. Toner (Eds.), Whose Freedom, Security 
and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 277 (2007). 
65
 See S. Peers, ‘New EU rules on maritime surveillance: will they stop the deaths and pushs-backs in the 
Mediterranean? Statewatch, 2014. 
66
 Meijers Committee, Standing committee of experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal 
law, Note on the Proposal for a Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea 
borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex (COM(2013) 197 final), 23 
May 2013. 
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competent authority before the removal was enforced, including interpreters, legal 
advisers and a suspension of the return in case an appeal is lodged.67 Indeed, the 
Regulation does not guarantee the access to an effective remedy, as laid down in Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, before the illegal migrants or refugees are 
disembarked or forced to enter a third country. 
Nevertheless, the Regulation does not lay down a legal framework in which Frontex 
operations in the territorial sea of third countries must be carried out. Regard should be 
paid to the fact that in the context of Operations HERA II and III in 2008, the bilateral 
agreements concluded between Spain and Mauritania and Spain and Senegal furnished 
the legal basis for such operations. The Regulation does not apply in a similar situation 
and there are no guarantees that the obligation of non-refoulement applies 
extraterritorially in the operations carried out in the territorial waters of third 
countries.68 However, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed in Hirsi v. Italy 
that the contracting State’s responsibility is not avoided by relying on its obligations 
arising out of bilateral agreements with third countries.69 Consequently, as it was 
pointed out above, the States remain subject to their international human rights 
obligations when they carry out extraterritorial activities in the territorial waters of third 
states. 
As a result of the demands of the European Parliament, Frontex will have to prepare 
annual reports on the practical application of the Regulation, including a description of 
the procedures put in place during sea operations and ‘detailed information on the 
application on compliance with fundamental rights and the impact of those rights, and 
any incidents which may have taken place’.70 These reports will allow to control 
whether Frontex and the Member States participating in joint operations respecting the 
obligations arising from the main international human rights instruments. 
The question of whether the prohibition to disembark or to hand over the intercepted 
persons to a third state, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement, includes certain 
                                                           
67See para. 202 and 205 (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, supra note 58). 
 
68
 According to Carrera and Den Hertog “since Article 14(1) of the 2011 amended Frontex Regulation 
and Recital 5 of the Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations now clearly stipulate the 
respect for Union law even if cooperation takes place in third state territorial waters, these kinds of 
practices will now trigger the responsibility of Frontex for possible incidents and human rights violations” 
(supra note 12, pp. 11-12). 
69
 Para. 129 (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, supra note 58). 
70Article 13 (2) of Regulation nº 656/2014, supra note 1. 
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Member States or not should be raised. Account must be taken of the fact that Greece 
has been as an unsafe State both by the European Court of Human Rights and by the 
European Court of Justice.71 In those cases, Frontex participating units can face the 
difficult task of opting between disembarking the intercepted persons in the host State 
or participating Member State or respecting the obligation of non-refoulement. Since 
Article 4 (1) of the Regulation refers to principle in general terms, it should be 
understood as including any EU Member State.72 
As it was pointed out in the introduction of this paper, Frontex has been severely 
criticised from its early days for not paying sufficient regard to human rights in the 
context of its border surveillance operations.73 These critics were confirmed by the 
absence of any mention to the principle of non-refoulement in the 2004 Frontex 
Regulation.74 Regulation 1168/2011, which modified the 2004 Frontex Regulation, 
constantly states that the Agency is fully committed to respecting fundamental human 
rights both when it is acting independently and when it is in cooperation with third 
countries and international organizations.75 While the situation remains far from 
satisfactory, Frontex has undertaken a number of initiatives with a view to integrating 
fundamental human rights in its activities, such as the Frontex Fundamental Rights 
Strategy, the Frontex Consultative Forum on human rights and the appointment of a 
Fundamental Rights Officer.76 
6. Conclusions 
The new Regulation establishes a legal framework to regulate the Frontex sea border 
surveillance operations that deals not only with border surveillance strictly speaking, 
but also SAR and disembarkation of persons carried out within the context of Frontex 
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 See ECHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application nº 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011; 
Judgment of 21 December 2011, N.S. and others, C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
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 S. Peers, supra note 65. 
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 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Frontex: human rights responsibilities, Doc. 13161 
8 April 2013. 
74
 Council Regulation nº 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ L 349, 1 (25 Nov 2004). 
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 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
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Judicial Controls’ 20 (2015) European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 118-136; A. Spengeman, ‘Upholding 
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sea border operations. The broad concept of border surveillance adopted by the 
Regulation is better suited to the challenges constantly faced by Frontex operations 
compared to that included in the 2010 Decision, annulled by the Court of Justice in 
2012. In the practice, it appears that most of Frontex border surveillance activities at sea 
end up becoming search and rescue operations. Therefore, the Regulation on maritime 
operations coordinated by Frontex must be praised for clarifying the rules applicable to 
all aspects of operations at sea, including interception, SAR and disembarkation. 
With regard to the detection and interception of vessels, the Regulation distinguishes 
between the measures that may be taken in the territorial sea, on the high seas and in the 
contiguous zone. The Regulation substantially contributes to clarifying the conditions 
under which these measures may be taken. Obviously, Frontex surveillance operations 
at sea are bound by the legal framework laid down in the UNCLOS with respect to the 
territorial waters and the high seas. 
While the rules included in the 2010 Decision on SAR situations were not binding, the 
Regulation includes a set of binding rules. It was precisely this legally binding character 
that caused the fierce opposition from a group of States with Mediterranean Sea borders. 
It is indeed rather paradoxical that at the same time as Italy was developing the Mare 
Nostrum operation - in the framework of which thousands of persons at sea have been 
rescued – it was also the biggest opponent to the imposition of new obligations and 
responsibilities on SAR under EU law. 
The new Regulation clearly shows that Frontex surveillance sea operations are subject 
to international obligations stemming from the main human rights instruments and, in 
particular, to the principle of non-refoulement. In determining whether a given person 
can be disembarked or returned to a third country, the new rules oblige to take into 
account the human rights situation in the third country, to identify the intercepted or 
rescued persons, to inform the persons on board of their destination and to give them the 
opportunity to express reasons for believing that the disembarkation in the proposed 
country would violate the principle of non-refoulement. Since the Regulation applies 
not only to the interception and rescue of migrants in the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone, but also to similar activities carried out on the high seas, the principle of non-
refoulement clearly applies to the Frontex border surveillance operations carried out 
extraterritorially. Concerning extraterritorial application of the obligation of non-
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refoulement to the interception operations of migrants in the territorial seas of third 
countries, the Regulation does not apply. For that reason, in view of avoiding possible 
violations of human rights obligations of the Member States and, in particular, of the 
principle of non-refoulement, it is necessary to underline that, despite the Regulation 
does not apply to the territorial waters of third countries, Member States remain subject 
to their international human rights obligations when they are involved in border 
surveillance activities extraterritorially. 
 
 
